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Complementary, Not Competing,
Claims of Law and Religion:
An Islamic Perspective
Abdullahi A. An-Nacim*
I.
II.
III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION
ISLAM, STATE, AND POLITICS
SHARIA AND STATE LAW
PROMOTING COMPLEMENTARITY THROUGH NORMATIVE
PLURALISM AND LEGAL UNIFORMITY
I. INTRODUCTION

Whatever view any of us has about the relationship between law and
religion is founded on a certain conception of law in relation to a specific
understanding of a particular religion.1 Whether we accept the possibility of
mutual influence, or influence by either normative system on the other,
would be premised on our particular expectation of what that influence
might be. In other words, our view of this relationship is always based on
our knowledge and experience of our own legal and religious normative
systems, and not on an abstract conception of law or of religion. This will
be the case whether we are supportive or critical of those normative systems.
Moreover, some of us may claim or assume that our views of the

* Charles Howard Chandler Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; Ph.D. in
Law, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, 1976; Diploma. in Criminology, University of Cambridge,
England, 1973; LL.B., University of Cambridge, England, 1973; LL.B., University of Khartoum,
Sudan, 1970. This Article is a part of Pepperdine University School of Law’s February 2012
conference entitled, The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?
Substantial portions of this Article are derived from my earlier works, as noted in each Part.
1. For a similar discussion, see Abdullahi A. An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics: Separate but
Interactive, (Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/0217islamic%
20world/2007islamforum_an%20naim.pdf [hereinafter An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics] (a
substantially revised version of Abdullahi A. An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive Legislation: Is an
Islamic State Possible or Viable?, in 5 Y.B.. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 29 (Eugene Cotran & Chibli
Mallat eds., 2000) [hereinafter An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive Legislation]).
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relationship between law and religion are supported by what we think we
know about other legal and religious normative systems.
There is no possibility for human comprehension, reflection, and
communication about the relationship of law and religion that is not
premised on some specific view of law and of religion. However critical we
are of law, and whatever belief we hold about religion, that can only be of
those institutions as we know and experience them. In other words, it is
never about law and religion in the abstract, but always about a specific view
of particular legal and religious traditions, as viewed through the inherently
limited experience of human beings. Since this cannot be exhaustive or
conclusive of all religious and legal traditions, we should accept the
possibility of alternative views of the relationship between law and religion
in different contexts.
In this light, I propose to argue for the following propositions about the
relationship between law and religion. First, we should all be open to reconsidering our view of this relationship for different conceptions of law and
experiences of religion. Second, we should accept the possibility of dynamic
change and transformation of any legal system or religious tradition.2 As
clearly indicated by the historical evolution of legal systems and religious
traditions, these institutions are always changing, though not always in
predictable or predetermined ways. Although one cannot predict or preempt
how these institutions will evolve, I am unable to see how one can rationally
assert that this or that is the way this legal system or that religion are to be
for eternity. Third, and most importantly, locating the human agency of
citizens and believers at the core of both law and religion, respectively,
indicates possibilities of mutual influence to the ends of upholding
individual freedom and social justice for all. When people are free to make
and change the law as they wish and practice the religion they choose as
they understand it, they are more likely to seek and progressively realize a
humane view of law and an enlightened view of religion.
There is of course nothing inevitable about these outcomes, but the
question for me is a matter of moral choice and of political action by citizens
and believers as human subjects. This Article’s task is to explore and clarify
what this approach means for law and religion from an Islamic perspective
in the historical and present context of Islamic societies. The premise of my
argument in this Article is that every law enforcement system should be
founded on compliance by the general population as the norm, in order to be
able to deal with violations as exceptional. Otherwise, the system will not
have the necessary political support, and human and material resources to
cope with massive and persistent violations of its norms. The challenge for

2.
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every legal system is to draw on ethical as well as pragmatic or utilitarian
bases of large scale and consistent compliance without surrendering its own
autonomy and political accountability to the totality of the population.
There are many possible sources of support for compliance among the
population at large, but religion is certainly one of the strongest historical, as
well as contemporary, bases of the motivation for believers to comply with
legal norms.
The reality of mutual influence of law and religion is due to the
normative overlap between these two normative systems, in that they both
seek to regulate human behavior through similar ethical sanctions. For
instance, to steal is both a crime and a sin at the same time, but it is not a
crime because it is a sin, and it is not a sin because it is a crime. Although
they apply to the same human conduct, these are two separate
characterizations, based on different rationales and leading to different
outcomes. The fact that legal and religious norms may relate to the same
human conduct creates the false impression that they are competing, but the
different sources, nature, and consequences of the underlying authority of
these two domains indicate the opposite. Despite apparent perceptions of
competing claims, we should see the complementarity and interdependence
of law and religion in that the law needs religious sanction to legitimize the
coercive authority of the law, while religion needs the coercive authority of
the law to protect peace, social justice, and cohesion among all citizens
equally, believers and non-believers alike.
For this view of mutual influence of law and religion to be persuasive
for non-believers, complementarity and interdependence can mean neither
the permanent exclusion of religious norms from the possibility of legal
enforcement nor their legal enforcement simply because they are religious
norms. There is a realm of legitimate interaction between legal and religious
norms, for instance, when a religious norm indicates social disapproval
among believers, thereby raising the demand or expectation for civil
authorities to punish the conduct. This is part of the broader interaction of
ethnical and cultural norms, social practices, and legal sanction among most
human societies. The problem emerges when religious disapproval is the
sole basis of legal sanction, like when a sin is automatically deemed to be a
crime, without requiring additional reasons to justify the need for legal
punishment. Although the distinction between a crime and a sin may vary
from one society to another, and for the same society over time, the need for
this distinction is clear for all societies. For instance, to lie is a sin, but
additional harm or injury must be shown to follow before a lie should be
punished as a crime. This Article will explore a theory of law and Islam for
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clarifying the criteria and process through which a sin may become a crime,
without claiming to specify or determine how that should be done in all
Islamic societies.
In particular, I am concerned with the relationship between the positive
law of the postcolonial state on the one hand, and Sharica as the normative
system of Islam on the other. By the term “law” I mean law that is made
and enforced by the state, in contrast to Sharica which is the expression of
religious norms as understood and practiced by believers. The premise of
my argument is that Sharica, by its nature and purpose, can only be freely
observed by believers, and its principles lose their religious authority and
value when enforced by the state. It is from this fundamentally religious
perspective that the state must not be allowed to claim the authority of Islam,
regardless of whether or not such claims are made by ruling elites. As I
have previously noted in my other work, on the one hand, the functions of
the state, including adjudication among competing claims of religious and
secular authorities, are secular functions of a political institution that should
not be allowed to claim religious authority. Since whatever standards or
mechanisms are imposed by the organs of the state to determine official
policy and formal legislation will necessarily be based on the human
judgment of those who control those institutions, state policy and legislation
should not be misrepresented as “religious.” This is what I refer to as the
separation of Islam and the state. On the other hand, the religious beliefs of
Muslims, whether as officials of the state or private citizens, tend to
influence their actions and political behavior. I refer to this reality as the
connectedness of Islam and politics.3
Part of the difficulty is that the apparently dominant discourse about
Islamic societies today assumes a simplistic notion that there is something
called an Islamic state that is authorized to “enforce” the totality of Sharica.4
This view tends to lay the burden of proof on those who oppose the claim of
an Islamic state, as if this is the historical theological truth. To the best of
my knowledge, it is not only that there has never been agreement among
Muslim scholars in the past or opinion leaders at present on what constitutes
an “Islamic state,” but there is no theoretical possibility of that happening in
the future. The Qur’an and Sunna (traditions of the Prophet) never mention
the term “state” a single time, let alone offer any guidance on defining it.5
There is, of course, strong emphasis on justice and good governance, but
there is no mention of particular models of how that might be achieved. The
Qur’an and Sunna speak to believers as human beings, and never address an

3. See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE
FUTURE OF SHARICA 4–6 (2008) [hereinafter AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE].
4. See An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive Legislation, supra note 1, at 1.
5. See generally QUR’AN (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
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institution.6 When texts of the Qur’an or Sunna refer to a collective entity,
they do so in terms of a community of believers, not a “believing
community.” Muslims were, of course, ruled by states throughout history,
and many rulers of those states sought religious legitimization, but they did
not claim to establish “an Islamic state.”7 When we consider the two
modern states that claimed this for the first time in Muslim history, namely
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we find that
the founding doctrine of each state is deemed to be a heresy by the founding
doctrine of the other state. There is simply no way of deciding, from an
Islamic point of view, whether either of the two (the Twelever’s Shia
doctrine of Iran or the Wahabi doctrine of Saudi Arabia) is valid, simply
because religious truth cannot be determined by political means or majority
vote.
Once we step away from such absolute claims of an Islamic mandate for
the enforcement of Sharica by the state, we can find ample opportunities for
collaboration between Sharica and state law as complementary, rather than
competing normative domains.8 This can be done through normative
pluralism in communities within the framework of uniformity of the legal
system of the state9. Briefly stated, this means that Muslims may live in
accordance with their voluntary compliance with Sharica, but also subject to
the safeguards of constitutionalism, human rights and equal citizenship for
all as enforced by the state. This is not a matter of preference of state law
over religious law, but rather is the consequence of the fact that religious law
is no longer religious when coercively enforced by the state. In contrast,
Sharica retains its religious quality when observed voluntarily with the intent
to comply, but this cannot be imposed on others through the coercive
authority of the state. Another element of the proposed approach is the
possibility of jurisprudential influence of Sharica on state law, provided that
it is adopted through the normal lawmaking process and that it is subject to
constitutional safeguards.10 To introduce that possibility, I will first explain
the related concepts of Islam, state and politics, and I will try to clarify the

6. See id. at 42:38 (“[R]espond to their Lord and keep up the prayer; conduct their affairs by
mutual consultation; give to others out of what We have provided for them.”).
7. See An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 7.
8. For a discussion of Sharica, see AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 3.
9. For further discussion on normative pluralism, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim, Religious
Norms and Family Law: Is It Legal or Normative Pluralism?, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 785, 790–91
(2011) [hereinafter An-Nacim, Religious Norms].
10. See id. at 807.
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dynamic relationship between Sharica and state law within the framework of
the modern concept of self-determination.
II. ISLAM, STATE, AND POLITICS11
The proponents of “an Islamic state” tend to cite the Prophet’s state in
Medina (622–632 AD) as the historical model of the implementation of
Sharica in the life of the community; however, that experience was too
exceptional to be relevant as a model for the modern state and the present
postcolonial world that is defined by global economic and political interdependence and integration. Even at the extremely limited and exceptional
context in which the Muslims of Medina lived, the implementation of
Sharica in that instance was not done through practices of state legislation
and administration that can be applied today. Aside from the extraordinary
fact of the actual existence of the Prophet, who continued to receive and
explain revelation throughout that time, and his personal charisma and moral
leadership, the Medina state was made of closely-knit tribal communities of
highly-motivated new converts living within an extremely limited space.
That experience was also based more on the moral authority of social
conformity than on the coercive power of the state as experienced in other
human societies, and it was a unique phenomenon that ended with the
Prophet’s death.12 The historical experience and theological frame of
reference we are dealing with in examining the relationship between Islam,
state and politics is that of the rest of the history of Islamic societies, and not
the exceptional experience of the Prophet in Medina.
While the term “Islamic state” may serve as shorthand for referring to
states where Muslims constitute a clear majority of the population, the
adjective “Islamic” logically applies to a people, rather than to a state as a
political institution. The term “Islamic state” is sometimes used to refer to
those countries that have officially proclaimed Islam to be the state religion,
or where Sharica is a formal source of legislation. This characterization is
misleading because such features do not accurately reflect an identifiable
and verifiable “Islamic” quality of the state itself as a political institution.
Unless one is willing to accept every claim by a state to be Islamic, the
question becomes who has the authority to determine the quality of being
Islamic and according to which criteria. In terms of the example given
earlier, the religious and political establishment of Saudi Arabia is unlikely
to accept the claim of the present government of Iran that it is an “Islamic
republic,” or even accept the notion of an Islamic republic. From the Iranian

11. Substantial portions of Part II are revised and unrevised excerpts from An-Nacim, Islam,
State and Politics, supra note 1, and AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 3.
12. An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 10–11.
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point of view, the Saudi monarchy is, by definition, un-Islamic and cannot
possibly be legitimized by its purported commitment to the enforcement of
Sharica.13
The main points I wish to make regarding the relationship among Islam,
state, and politics for present Islamic societies can be summarized as
follows. First, Islam and the state must be institutionally separate in order to
safeguard the possibility of being Muslim out of personal conviction rather
than conformity to the coercive will of the state. The enforcement of Sharica
through the coercive power or authority of the state is neither desirable nor
possible in the modern context of a territorial nation-state.14 For instance,
the Sharica system of dhimmihood, can be neither applied today to classify
the population on the basis of religion, nor legitimately avoided because of
its drastic and detailed legal consequences in every aspect of daily life.15
The alternative view of the separation of Islam and the state would simply
avoid the religious mandate claim, without excluding Islamic discourse from
the public domain of policy and legislation, as I will briefly explain later. I
am calling for separation of Islam and the state, while maintaining the
connectedness of Islam and politics, by distinguishing the state from politics
by defining the state as the institutional continuity of sovereignty and
politics as the government of the day. The distinction, not dichotomy, is
between the institutions of the state, like the Department of State, Justice
Department, on the one hand, and Secretary of State, and Attorney General
as members of the government of the day, on the other hand. Succeeding
governments with differing political mandates use the same institutions of
the state to discharge their respective mandates without violating the
autonomy and integrity of the institutions of the state, thereby enabling the
next government to use the same departments to discharge its political
mandate.
The state is a complex web of organs, institutions, and processes that are
supposed to implement the policies that are adopted through the political
process of each society. It signifies the continuity of institutions like the
judiciary and administrative agencies, as distinguished from the government

13.
14.
15.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 1.
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim, Beyond Dhimmihood: Citizenship and Human Rights, in 6 THE
NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM: MUSLIMS AND MODERNITY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY SINCE
1800, at 314 (Robert W. Hefner ed., 2010).
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or regime of the day, which is the product of current politics.16 The state
should therefore be the more settled and deliberately operational side of selfgovernance, while politics is the dynamic process of making choices among
competing policy options. To fulfill that and other functions, the state must
have what is known as a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, which is
the ability to impose its will on the population at large. This coercive power
of the state, which is now more extensive and effective than ever before in
human history, will be counterproductive when exercised in an arbitrary
manner or for corrupt or illegitimate ends. That is why it is critically
important to keep the state as neutral as humanly possible, which requires
constant vigilance by the generality of citizens, acting through a wide variety
of political, legal, and other strategies and mechanisms.17
The distinction between the state and politics assumes constant
interaction among the organs and institutions of the state on the one hand,
and organized political and social actors, and their competing visions of the
public good on the other. This distinction is also premised on an acute
awareness of the risks of abuse or corruption that necessarily come with the
coercive powers of the state. The state should not be a complete reflection
of daily politics because it must be able to mediate and adjudicate among the
competing visions and policy proposals, which require it to remain relatively
independent from different political forces in society. But complete
independence is not possible because of the political nature of the state,
which cannot be totally autonomous from those political actors who control
it. This reality makes it necessary to strive for a degree of separation of the
state from politics, so that those excluded by the political processes of the
day can still resort to state organs and institutions for protection against the
excesses and abuses of power by state officials.18
This necessary balancing of competing claims and tense relationships
can be mediated through principles and mechanisms of constitutionalism,
rule of law, and the protection of the equal human rights of all citizens. But
these principles and institutions cannot succeed without the active and
determined participation of at least significant majority of citizens, which is
unlikely if people believe them to be inconsistent with those religious beliefs

16. GRAEME GILL, THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE 2–3 (2003);
GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE STATE: ITS NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS 19–33 (Stanford
Univ. Press 1990).
17. GILL, supra note 16, at 17–20; see also An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at
2–3.
18. An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 2; see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What
Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 539–40 (2008)
(“[For example], [t]he benefits [of interest groups] include supplying valuable information and
advice for government actions and thus increasing the transparency of government, and creating a
mechanism through which citizens can both participate in politics generally and influence specific
government actions, all of which supports our representative form of government.”).
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and cultural norms that influence their political behavior. For example, the
principles of popular sovereignty and democratic governance presuppose
that citizens are sufficiently motivated and determined to participate in all
aspects of self-governance, including participation in organized political
action to hold their government accountable and responsive to their wishes.
This motivation and determination is partly influenced by the religious
beliefs and cultural conditioning of citizens. In other words, it is necessary
for believers to find some religious justification of constitutionalism and
human rights as the necessary framework for regulating the public role of
religion.19
As I see it, the challenge facing Islamic societies today is how to
separate Islam and the state despite the connectedness of Islam and politics.
My objective is to affirm and support the institutional separation of Islam
and the state as necessary for Sharica to have its proper positive and
enlightening role in the lives of Muslims and Islamic societies. This view
can also be called “the religious neutrality of the state,” whereby state
institutions neither favor nor disfavor any religious doctrine or principle.
Such neutrality is necessary for ensuring and protecting the freedom of
individuals in their communities to adopt, object to or modify any view of
religious doctrine or principles. I am therefore emphasizing the separation
of Islam and the state in order to realize the purpose of Sharica, rather than to
negate its central role in the lives of Muslims.20
The context of the constant negotiation of the relationships among
Islam, state, and politics in present Islamic societies is shaped by profound
transformations in the political, social, and economic structures and
institutions under which all Muslims live in community with other believers
and nonbelievers today. This context is also shaped by the internal political
and social conditions of each society, including the internalization of
externally inspired changes, whereby Islamic societies have continued to
follow Western forms of state formation, education, social organization, and
economic, legal, and administrative arrangements even after achieving
political independence. All present Islamic societies not only live within
territorial states that are significantly integrated into global systems of
economic, political, and security interdependence and cross-cultural
influence, but have voluntarily continued to participate in these processes
long after they have achieved political independence from European

19.
20.

An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
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colonialism. These realities require the corresponding safeguards of
constitutionalism and human rights protection.
Contrary to the claims of its proponents, a so-called Islamic state to
enforce Sharica as positive legislation undermines the possibility of an
Islamic way of life, not its realization, because it will have to be based on a
particular view of Islam that is not accepted by some Muslims who are
subject to the jurisdiction of the state. In other words, the repudiation of the
dangerous illusion of an Islamic state to coercively enforce Sharica
principles is necessary for the practical ability of Muslims and other citizens
to live in accordance with their religious and other beliefs. Ironically, the
notion of an Islamic state that is asserted in the name of self-determination is
a postcolonial idea that is premised on a European model of the state and a
totalitarian view of law and public policy as instruments of social
engineering by ruling elites. Although the states that have historically ruled
over Muslims did seek political legitimacy in a variety of ways, including
through religion, they did not claim to be Islamic states.
The proponents of a so-called Islamic state in the modern context seek
to use the powers and institutions of the state, as constituted by European
colonialism and continued after independence, to coercively regulate
individual behavior and social relations in the specific ways selected by
ruling elites. It is particularly dangerous to attempt to implement such
totalitarian models in the name of Islam because that would make it far more
difficult to resist than when that is done by a secular state that does not claim
religious legitimacy. At the same time, the separation of religion and the
state is not easy because the state will necessarily have to regulate the role of
religion in order to maintain its own religious neutrality, which is necessary
for the role of the state as mediator and adjudicator among competing social
and political forces, as mentioned above.21
In making my argument from an Islamic point of view, I remain
convinced that succeeding generations of Muslims have always sought to
discover what God had decreed or willed for them to do or be (hukm Allah),
as they believe that to be the divine guidance for all aspects of their daily
life. But I also see that “Islamic jurisprudence is a speculative essay to
comprehend the precise terms of Allah’s law.”22 It is reasonable to assume
that generations of Muslims through the ages generally earnestly strove to
live up to the ideals set by the Prophet and early generations of Muslims as a
matter of personal conviction. I am not concerned here with an assessment
or evaluation of whether, and to what extent, any generation or group of
Muslims have failed or succeeded in either discovering God’s decree or will

21.
22.
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NOEL J. COULSON, CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 41 (1969).
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regarding any matter, or whether and how they have managed to live up to
that ideal from a sociological or anthropological point of view. The question
I am addressing here is whether it is possible for any state, however
constituted and rationalized, to enforce Sharica through positive legislation.23
Affirming the religious neutrality of the state does not mean that Islamic
principles are irrelevant to law and public policy. Indeed, Muslims can and
should propose policy or legislation out of their religious or other beliefs, as
all citizens have the right to do so, but must support such proposals in terms
of “civic reason,” instead of simply asserting them as required by Sharica.
By civic reason I mean the need for reasons of policy and legislation to be
publicly declared, as well as that the process of reasoning on the matter
should be open and accessible to all citizens. In other words, the rationale
and purpose of public policy or legislation must be based on the sort of
reasoning that the generality of citizens can accept or reject, as well as make
counterproposals to through public debate and without reference to religious
belief or doctrine. Civic reason and reasoning, and not personal beliefs and
motivation, are necessary whether Muslims constitute the majority or
minority of the population of the state, because even if Muslims are the
predominant majority, they would not agree on what policy and legislation
necessarily follow from their Islamic beliefs.24
It is unrealistic and unwise to expect people to fully comply with the
requirements of civic reason because such choices are made within the realm
of inner motivation and intentions. It is difficult to tell why people vote in a
particular way or how they justify their political agenda to themselves or to
their close associates. But the objective should be to promote and encourage
civic reasons and reasoning while diminishing the exclusive influence of
personal religious beliefs over time. The requirement of civic reasons and
reasoning processes does not assume that people who control the state can
be neutral. On the contrary, this requirement must be the basis of the
operation of the state precisely because people are likely to continue to act
on personal beliefs or justifications. The requirement to publicly and openly
present justifications that are based on reasons that the general population
can freely accept or reject will, over time, encourage and develop a broader
consensus among the population at large, beyond the narrow religious or
other beliefs of various individuals and groups. Since the ability to present
civic reasons and debate them publicly is already present in most societies,
what I am calling for is the deliberate and incremental enhancement and

23.
24.

An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 7–8.
Id. at 8–9.
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development of these processes and their underlying culture over time,
rather than suggesting that this concept is completely absent now, or that it is
expected to be fully realized immediately.25
In conclusion of this section, what is at issue is whether Sharica can in
fact be enforced as such by the state, as distinguished from voluntary
compliance with its dictates by Muslims out of personal religious conviction
or choice. The significance of this distinction can be seen in the difference
between the formal legal prohibition of paying or taking interest for loans as
a matter of economic and social policy, as opposed to refraining from
engaging in such practices because they constitute usury (riba), which is
prohibited for Muslims under Sharica.26 Another example is the difference
between outlawing insurance contracts as too speculative or contingent, in
contrast to personal abstention from engaging in these practices because they
are not allowed to Muslims as speculative contracts with inherently
uncertain outcomes (qharar). The point here is to emphasize the difference
between enforcing legal principles and rules in accordance with the constitutional standards and legislative process of the country, regardless of their
original source, as distinguished from enforcing them because that is
required by Sharica as the will of God. In my view, past or current claims or
demands to enforce Sharica through legislation by the state are based on a
historical fallacy, as that is inconsistent with the nature of Sharica itself and
impossible for the state, as constituted today, in any country in the world. 27
In other words, it is neither possible to conceive of this possibility in
theoretical terms, nor is it true that such a model existed in the past so that it
can be reenacted today. The question then becomes what should the role of
Sharica be in a modern-state society in its present global context?28
III. SHARIA AND STATE LAW29
What came to be known among Muslims as Sharica was in fact the
product of a very slow, gradual and spontaneous process of interpretation of
the Qur’an, and a collection, verification, and interpretation of Sunna during

25. Id. at 9–10.
26. See QUR’AN, supra note 5, at 3:130.
27. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAcIM, AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ROLE OF ISLAM
105 (2006) (“A state that seeks to enforce some general principles of Sharica regarding public affairs
and governance would find it extremely difficult to fulfill its essential domestic and international
functions in the present increasingly global context.”).
28. An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 10.
29. Substantial portions of Part III are revised and unrevised excerpts from An-Nacim, Islam,
State and Politics, supra note 1, and An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive Legislation, supra note 1.

1242

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 1231, 2013]

1/9/13 2:46 PM

Complementary Not Competing Claims
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

the first three centuries of Islam (the seventh to the ninth centuries AD).30
This process took place among scholars and jurists who developed their own
methodology for the classification of sources, derivation of specific rules
from general principles, and so forth. That technical aspect of their work
came to be known as the “science of the foundations” or the “principles of
human understanding of divine sources” (usul al-fiqh).
As one would expect, there was much disagreement and disputation
among those early scholars about the meaning and significance of different
aspects of the sources with which they were working. Moreover, although
those founding scholars are generally accepted to have been acting
independently from the political authorities of the time, their work could not
have been in isolation from the prevailing conditions of their communities,
in local as well as broader regional contexts. Those factors must have also
contributed to disagreements among the jurists and sometimes to differences
in the views expressed by the same jurist from one time to another, as is
reported of the changes in the view of Imam al-Shaf’i when he moved from
Iraq to Egypt. Even after those disagreements eventually evolved into
separate schools of thought (madhahib), differences of opinion persisted
among scholars of the same schools, as well as between different schools.31
The significant question to ask here is, how can Sharica principles be
divinely predetermined if they can only be discovered through human
understanding of the Qur’an and Sunna? “How is it possible for the jurist
(faqih) to conclude at the end of a very empirical evaluation and research of
facts and texts, that his conclusions constitute a transcendental and divine
authority?”32 The obvious answer is that whatever ruling a jurist reaches
remains a matter of human judgment and cannot constitute transcendental or
divine authority. Jurists or scholars, however highly respected they may be,
and even if their views came to be universally accepted by Muslims
everywhere (which of course has never happened for any of them), can only
present their own views of what God has decreed on any matter.
A distinction is commonly drawn in Islamic discourse between Sharica
and fiqh. “Sharica law is the product of legislation (Sharic), of which God is
the ultimate subject (shric). Fiqh law consists of legal understanding, of

30. See generally ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NACIM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL
LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–33 (1990) [hereinafter AN-NACIM,
ISLAMIC REFORMATION]; NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964).
31. An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 11–12; see also AN-NACIM, ISLAMIC
REFORMATION, supra note 30, at 17–18.
32. Ebrahim Moosa, Allegory of the Rule (ukm): Law as Simulacrum in Islam?, 38 HIST.
RELIGIONS 1, 21 (1998).
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which the human jurist is the subject (faqh).”33 This distinction can be
useful in a technical sense because it indicates that some principles or rules,
as compared to others, are more based on speculative thinking than textual
support from the Qur’an and Sunna. But this does not mean that those
principles that are taken to be Sharica, rather than fiqh, are the direct product
of revelation because the Qur’an and Sunna cannot be understood or have
any influence on human behavior except through the effort of fallible human
beings.34
Although the law is of divine provenance, the actual construction of
the law is a human activity, and its results represent the law of God
as humanly understood. Since the law does not descend from
heaven ready-made, it is the human understanding of the law—the
human fiqh—that must be normative for society.35
The founding jurists and scholars of Sharica exercised profound
acceptance of diversity of opinion because they were highly aware of and
sensitive to the risks of human error. At the same time, they promoted
consensus among themselves and their communities in the interest of
normative stability by holding that whatever was accepted as valid by
consensus (ijma) among all jurists (or the wider Muslim community
according to some jurists) to be permanently binding on subsequent
generations of Muslims.36 Since the idea of a believer’s consent to the ruling
is the basis of its binding authority, it is problematic to hold subsequent
generations bound by the views of earlier Muslims. Whether the consensus
is supposed to be of a group of scholars or of the community at large, why
should the view of one generation bind subsequent generations? Whatever
solutions one may find for such conceptual and practical difficulties, that
answer will itself always be the product of human judgment. In other words,
Sharica norms cannot possibly be drawn from the Qur’an and Sunna except
through human understanding, which necessarily means both the
inevitability of differences of opinion and the possibility of error, whether
the matter is decided among scholars or the community in general.37 It is
remarkable that the founding scholars of Islamic jurisprudence would have
no difficulty with this idea of the unattainability of certainty because they

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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believed that any human knowledge of Sharica is inherently and permanently
suppositional (zani), never certain.38
This religious and historical view raises a major objection for the
enforcement of Sharica as the law of the state. The basic dilemma here can
be explained as follows. On the one hand, there is the paramount
importance of a minimum degree of certainty in the determination and
enforcement of positive law for any society. The nature and role of positive
law in the modern state also requires the interaction of a multitude of actors
and complex factors that cannot possibly be contained by an Islamic
religious rationale. This is true of Islamic societies today more than ever
before because of their growing interdependence with non-Muslim societies
throughout the world. On the other hand, a religious rationale is key for the
binding force of Sharica norms for Muslims. Precisely because Sharica is
supposed to be binding on Muslims out of religious conviction, a believer
cannot be religiously bound except by what that believer personally accepts
as a valid interpretation of relevant texts of the Qur’an and Sunna. Yet,
given the diversity of opinions among Muslim jurists, whatever officials of
the state elect to enforce as positive law is bound to be deemed an invalid
interpretation of Islamic sources by some of the Muslim citizens of that
state.39
This dilemma has traditionally been mediated by holding that “each
individual Muslim was absolutely free to follow the school [of
jurisprudence] of his choice and that any Muslim tribunal was bound to
apply the law of the school to which the individual litigant belonged.”40
Accordingly, an individual also had the right to change his or her school of
law on a particular issue, and litigants selected and submitted to the
jurisdiction of the judge who would adjudicate their disputes.41 This
situation continued until the introduction of Al-Majallah by the Ottoman
Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century and more widely through
the enactment of family law codes since the 1920s.42

38. AVERROES, THE DECISIVE TREATISE DETERMINING THE CONNECTION
AND WISDOM 8–10 (Charles E. Butterworth trans., Brigham Univ. Press 2001).

BETWEEN THE LAW

39. An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 13–14;. An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive
Legislation, supra note 1, at 34–35.
40. COULSON, supra note 22, at 34.
41. KNUT S. VIKØR, BETWEEN GOD AND THE SULTAN: A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 174–80
(2005).
42. An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 14.
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The principle underlying the codes [of Islamic family law] is that
the political authority has the power, in the interests of uniformity,
to choose one rule from among equally authoritative variants and to
order the courts of his jurisdiction to apply that rule to the exclusion
of all others; and the choice of this rule or that has been made
simply on grounds of social desirability, the codes embodying those
variants which were deemed most suited to the present standards
and circumstances of the community.43
The imperatives of certainty and uniformity in national legislation are
now stronger than ever before; this is due not only to the growing complexity of the role of the state at the domestic or national level, but also to
the global interdependence of all peoples and their states. Despite the many
problems of the present national and international systems, the realities of
national and global political, economic, security and other relations remain
firmly embedded in the existence of sovereign states that have exclusive
jurisdiction over their citizens and territories. For Islamic societies, this
point has recently been painfully and traumatically emphasized by the eight
years of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the composition of the international
alliance of Muslim and non-Muslim countries which forced Iraq out of
Kuwait in 1991, as well as by the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003.
The governments of Muslim-majority countries on both sides of these
violent conflicts acted (and continue to act) as independent states rather than
as part of a uniform or united global Islamic community or on behalf of the
totality of Muslims at large.
The point here is not that the nature of the state is identical for all
societies, because the processes of state formation and consolidation vary
from one country to another. Rather, my point is that there are certain
common characteristics that all states need to have in order to be part of the
present international system because membership is conditional upon
recognition by other members. For the states ruling over Islamic societies to
be and remain accepted as members of the international community, they
must comply with a recognizable set of minimum features of statehood in
the present sense of the term. In particular, the ability to determine and
enforce the law in everyday life is central to the existence of any state,
regardless of its philosophical or ideological orientation. Moreover, as
explained in the next section, the nature of the state and its present global
context preclude the possibility of the application of Sharica as historically

43.
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understood by its founding jurists and still commonly accepted among
Muslims.44
All the above objections to the enforcement of Sharica through positive
law and the notion of an Islamic state do not, of course, preclude Muslims
from personally conforming by every aspect of Sharica. The fact that usury
and speculative contracts (riba and gharar) are not illegal in a given country
does not mean that Muslims have to engage in these practices. Any person
can simply abstain from any form of commercial transaction or personal
behavior in accordance with his or her own religious or moral convictions.
The arguments I am making here are against enforcement by the state, not to
suppress private conformity with the dictates of one’s beliefs. Indeed,
people may seek to reinforce the religious or moral values through the
activities of non-governmental organizations and other agencies of civil
society. It is true that legal prohibition will reinforce the authority of religious norms, but the question is how to ensure the freedom for personal
religious conformity without violating the rights of others. Human judgment
about law and public policy will necessarily have to be made in terms of a
cost-benefit balance of legal enforcement of any norm, in contrast to other
ways of promoting the social good. In the present limited space, I will focus
on the general framework within which any Islamic text, including the
Qur’an and Sunna, can influence public policy.45
The underlying assumption of claims to enforce Sharica through positive
legislation is that Islamic societies and communities have the right and
responsibility to organize their public and private lives in accordance with
the dictates of Islam. In modern terms, one can say that this is a matter of
political and cultural self-determination. But self-determination is not an
absolute right because the manner in which one group or entity exercises the
right will have consequences or implications for the rights of others. In
particular, all the states of Islamic societies are bound by customary
international law and humanitarian law, like any other state in the world.
They are also bound by all the international treaties they have ratified, such
as the Charter of the United Nations, which is binding on all of them as
members of that organization. All of these sources set clear and categorical
limits on what the states of Islamic societies may or may not do, both within
their own borders as well as in their dealings with other states and their
citizens. As a practical matter, other states do act on these principles in their

44. An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 15–16; An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive
Legislation, supra note 1, at 35–36.
45. An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 19.
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economic, political, security, and other dealings with the states of Islamic
societies. Whether it is the organization and operation of the state in
general, the treatment of vulnerable persons and groups who are their own
citizens, or the treatment of citizens of other countries, the states of Islamic
societies are not free to behave as they please.46
In conclusion of this section, I wish to emphasize that whether in its
traditional formulation, as known to Muslims today, or through some new or
modernist elaboration and articulation, Sharica will always remain a
historically conditioned human understanding of the Qur’an and Sunna of
the Prophet. While sharing the belief of Muslims that these sources are
divine, it is clear to me that their interpretation and expression as Sharica
norms will always remain a human endeavor, open to challenge and
reformulation through alternative human efforts. In other words, the divine
sources of Sharica cannot influence human life and experience except
through human agency in the understanding and implementation of those
sources in the specific historical context of Islamic societies. As indicated
earlier, this does not mean that Islamic societies are not entitled to realize
their right to self-determination in terms of an Islamic identity, or that they
are incapable of achieving that objective. On the contrary, I believe that
they do indeed have that right, and can realize it in practice. For that to
happen, however, I am suggesting that Islamic societies must categorically
renounce any commitment to a romantic ideal of an Islamic state that never
was, and expressly abandon expectations of the enforcement of Sharica as
such by the state.47
IV. PROMOTING COMPLEMENTARITY THROUGH NORMATIVE PLURALISM
AND LEGAL UNIFORMITY48
In light of the preceding discussion, I would argue that the nature of
Sharica as a religious normative system, on the one hand, and of the state and
state law as secular political institutions, on the other, require clear
differentiation between the two in theory and separation in practice.
However, the methodological and normative similarities between Sharica
and state law, and the fact that they both seek to regulate human behavior,
raise possibilities of dynamic interaction and cross-fertilization between the
two.49 For instance, interaction through civic reason, as I will discuss further

46. Id. at 19–20; An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive Legislation, supra note 1, at 38–39.
47. An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 16; An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive
Legislation, supra note 1, at 36.
48. Substantial portions of Part IV are revised and unrevised excerpts from Abdullahi Ahmed
An-Nacim, The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of Islamic Law and
State Law, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2010) [hereinafter An-Naicim, The Compatibility Dialectic].
49. An-Nacim, Religious Norms, supra note 9, at 800.
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below, can legitimize state law among religious believers, and change how
Muslims perceive and practice the social aspects of Sharica within the
framework of the constitutional and human rights obligations of the state.
Since the enforcement of Sharica through state institutions negates its
religious nature, the outcome will always be secular, not religious. As I see
it, the choice for Muslims regarding legal adjudication and enforcement of
rights and obligations is between good or bad secular law—by a good or bad
secular state. The choice is never between Sharica and secular law because
Sharica as such cannot be enforced as state law. The choice cannot be
between an Islamic and a secular state because it is not possible for the state
to be “Islamic.”50
This view does not dispute the religious authority of Sharica, which
exists only outside the framework of the state. Sharica is always relevant
and binding on Muslims, but only as each Muslim believes it to be and not
as declared and coercively enforced by the state. For any act to be
religiously valid, the individual believer must comply voluntarily with the
necessary pious intent (nya), and without violating the rights of others. This
focus on the individual believer is integral to Islam.51 Still, principles of
Sharica should be relevant to the public discourse, provided the argument is
made in terms of what I call “civic reason” and not simply by assertions of
what one believes to be the will of God. The process of civic reason also
requires conformity with constitutional and human rights standards in the
adoption and implementation of public policy and legislation. All citizens
must be able to make their own legislative proposal or object to what others
are proposing through public and fully inclusive public debate, without
having to challenge each other’s religious convictions. Moreover, by its
nature and rationale, civic reason is not limited to Sharica principles; it can
apply to other religious normative systems as well. Civic reason and
reasoning, not personal beliefs and motivation, are necessary whether
Muslims or members of any other religion or tradition constitute the
majority or the minority of the population of the state.52

50. An-Naicim, The Compatibility Dialectic, supra note 48, at 2.
51. The fundamental principle of individual personal responsibility that can never be abdicated
or delegated is one of the recurring themes of the Qur’an. See QUR’AN, supra note 5, at 6:164,
17:15, 35:18, 39:7, 52:21, 74:38. On individuality as the core value of Islam, see MAHMOUD
MOHAMED TAHA, THE SECOND MESSAGE OF ISLAM 62–77 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim trans.,
1987).
52. An-Nacim, The Compatibility Dialectic, supra note 48, at 3; see also AN-NAcIM, ISLAM AND
THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 3, at 92–101.
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The mediation of the dialectic of compatibility and incompatibility
suggests that these two types of relationships can exist between Sharica and
state law when the two systems apply to the same human subjects, within the
same space and time. On the one hand, the premise of my affirmation of the
incompatibility of the two systems is that Sharica and state law are different
types of normative systems, each based on its own sources of authority and
legitimacy. This does not mean that state law is superior or more effective
in regulating human behavior than Sharica (or any other nonstate system).
On the other hand, the possibilities of compatibility can draw on the
similarities in methodology and normative content of these two systems.
Moreover, Sharica normally requires and sanctions obedience to state law in
the interest of public peace and justice, and state law may in turn incorporate
some principles of Sharica through civic reason and subject to constitutional
safeguards.
Possibilities of compatibility are also supported by the fact that Sharica
and state law are complementary normative systems, rather than by requiring
either to conform to the nature and role of the other. The proposed
mediation of this dialectic is premised on a distinction (not dichotomy)
between Sharica and state law to avoid confusing the function, operation, and
nature of outcomes when the two systems coexist in the same space and
apply to the same human subjects. If state law enforces a principle of
Sharica, the outcome is a matter of state law and not Sharica because it does
not have the religious significance of compliance with a religious obligation.
Conversely, compliance with Sharica cannot be a legal justification for
violating state law. For Sharica and state law to be complementary, instead
of being in mutually destructive conflict, each system must operate on its
own terms and within its field of competence and authority.53
I should emphasize that my argument and analysis are intended to apply
whether Muslims constitute the predominant majority or a small minority of
a state’s population. Recalling the above-noted distinction between religious
law and state law, I argue that Sharica cannot be enacted into state law and
remain religious as such—regardless of the religious affiliation of the
population—but it can influence the development and interpretation of state
law and contribute to its legitimacy among Muslims. Egyptian jurist Abdul
Razeg Al-Sanhouri’s massive codification projects for several Arab
countries illustrate the potential possibilities of such a synthesis of
traditional Sharica jurisprudence and modern state law, whereby Sharica
principles are incorporated into modern legal codes as secular state law,
rather than Sharica as such.54

An-Nacim, The Compatibility Dialectic, supra note 48, at 3–4.
Id. at 4. See generally GUY BECHOR, THE SANHURI CODE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF
MODERN ARAB CIVIL LAW (1932 TO 1949) (2007).
53.
54.
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For the proposed mediation to work through the legitimate synthesis of
Sharica and state law, proponents of Sharica must abandon claims that
Sharica principles can or should be enacted into state law as a matter of
religious obligation.
Instead, they should advance Sharica as a
jurisprudential tradition and cultivate their own ability to persuade other
citizens of the utility and expediency of enacting specific principles of
Sharica as secular state law. The basic point, however, is that proponents of
the enactment of a Sharica norm (like prohibiting charging interest on loans,
and not in its religious quality as riba) should seek to persuade other citizens
by giving reasons that all can debate freely, rather than asserting their own
religious conviction or cultural affiliation as categorical justification. This
broader jurisprudential dimension does not imply that Sharica as such can be
compatible with state law in the sense that the two systems can coexist as
competing legal systems of any country. In view of the centralized,
bureaucratic, and coercive nature of the modern “territorial” state, the
secular legislative organs of the state must have an exclusive monopoly on
enacting state law, and secular judicial (and, as appropriate, administrative)
organs must also have exclusive authority to interpret and apply that law. At
the same time, some Sharica norms can be compatible with state law in
substantive terms through the jurisprudential dimension. The existence of
strong similarities between Sharica principles of, for instance, contracts,
property, and corresponding principles in many modern legal systems should
facilitate the incorporation of those principles into state law through civic
reason.55
To be clear on this point, if individual persons seek religious or any
other manner of private mediation of their disputes, there is no legitimate
way for the state to prevent it if the parties comply voluntarily with the
outcome. By the same token, however, none of the parties of such
mediation can resort to state courts for coercive enforcement, as failure to
voluntarily comply transforms the nature of the process from voluntary
private mediation to coercively enforced law of the state.56
The main objective of legal pluralism as an approach is to question the
focus of legal systems on the law of the centralized state and to recognize
and legitimatize

55. An-Nacim, The Compatibility Dialectic, supra note 48, at 4–5; see also WAEL B. HALLAQ,
SHARCA: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 239–45, 296–306 (respectively discussing
contracts and property) (2009).
56. An-Nacim, Religious Norms, supra note 9, at 794–95.
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[T]he informal counter-rules of the patchwork of minorities, the
quasi-laws of dispersed ethnic, religious, and cultural groups, the
disciplinary techniques of ‘private justice,’ the plurality of non-State
laws in associations, formal organizations, and informal
networks . . . . Plural, informal, local quasi-laws are seen as the
“supplement” of the official, formal centralism of the legal order.57
The main problem is that legal pluralists fail to account for the distinct
characteristics of the state, as distinguished from other normative systems.58
Clarifying the distinction, not dichotomy or hierarchy, between state law and
other “normative systems” may in fact enhance the underlying purpose and
rationale of legal pluralism by avoiding its confusion of different types of
regimes. In other words, a common problem with scholars of legal
pluralism is the failure to have a comprehensive definition of what they
mean by “law.” Social scientists who argue for the concept of legal
pluralism insist that law is found in the ordering of all kinds of social groups
and is not limited to official state legal institutions. Yet, legal pluralists are
unable to provide a basis by which to determine or delimit what is and what
is not law. The problem is not just that there is a variety of legal pluralisms
because they adopt different definitions of law, but also that they are unable
to distinguish “law” from other forms of normative order. If we call all
forms of ordering that are not state law by the term law, “[w]here do we stop
speaking of law and find ourselves simply describing social life?”59
I agree with this critique of theories that fail to make this distinction,
because we need to distinguish between compliance with coercive state law
and behavior out of religious belief and practice which must necessarily be
a matter of free conviction and voluntary action. It is true that states like
Iran and Saudi Arabia claim to enforce Sharica norms through the coercive
power of the state; but, a claim is not necessarily true because it is made by
some political elite in one country or another. More importantly, whatever
the state enacts and enforces ceases to be religious by the very fact that the
state coercively enforces it. Since religious belief logically requires the
possibility of disbelief, religious conviction and practice must be a matter of
choice. By affirming that “there is no compulsion in religion” (la ikraha fi
al-din), verse 2:256 of the Qur’an is not only saying that no person should be
compelled to believe, but is in fact asserting that whatever is coerced is not
religion at all because of the coercion. It is therefore necessary to

57. Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1443, 1443 (1992).
58. Brian Z Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30
SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 391–96 (2008).
59. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 878 (1988); see also AnNacim, Religious Norms, supra note 9, at 795–96.
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distinguish state law, which is by definition coercively enforced, and
religious norms, which by definition must be voluntarily observed.
It is not that every rule of law must be immediately coercively enforced,
but all legal rules are ultimately supported by the threat of coercive
enforcement, though that is less likely to happen in successful legal systems.
In contrast, the normative quality of Sharica principles is derived from a
religious frame of reference and authority outside state institutions, while
state law is always the secular political will of the state, and operates in state
courts and institutions. Taking an expansive and unrestrained view of the
terms “law” and “legal” to include norms that are religiously or culturally
binding will in fact be counterproductive for the purpose of the legal
pluralism. This does not mean that state law is superior or more effective
than other normative systems; but, since the source and authority of state law
are different from that of religious normative systems, it is confusing to use
the term “law” for both types of normative systems.60
As I have previously proposed, state law should be the exclusive legal
system coercively enforced by the state, while Sharica principles may be
observed voluntarily among communities of believers without being
enforced by the state. A question that may be raised here is how to regulate
the social practice of Sharica in order to protect the fundamental rights of all
citizens equally. If a human rights violation arises through the application of
state law, the state has the immediate obligation and ability to prevent its
officials from violating a human rights norm. The difficulty is when the
violation arises from the actions of nonstate actors in the context of, for
instance, a family or community mediation applying the rule that the father
must always have automatic custody of children regardless of a better claim
by the mother. According to current international human rights law, the
state is not responsible for human rights violations committed by nonstate
actors, but should exercise due diligence in doing what it can to prevent the
violation or hold the violator accountable. As often seen in so-called
domestic violence cases, it is difficult to hold the state accountable for its
due diligence obligation when the objectionable conduct happens in the
privacy of family and community. Still, I would argue that such risks of
human rights violations should be addressed through internal reform and
transformation of the understanding and practice of religious norms, instead
of the coercive intrusion by the state or other external actor.61

An-Nacim, Religious Norms, supra note 9, at 796–97.
Id. at 799. For more on this argument and relevant case studies, see CULTURAL
TRANSFORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA (Abdullahi Ahmed An-NaCim ed., 2002).
60.
61.
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The tendency in human rights scholarship, as well as among activists, is
to assume that a human right is protected simply because there is a law
affirming the right, or because a few cases have been “won” against
perpetrators. In the case of human rights of women, for instance, there is
little consideration of what happens to the women and children who “win”
when they return to the privacy of their families and communities.
Moreover, in the present postcolonial context in particular, state courts will
do more harm to the rights of women and children than good.62 Most
women and children are unlikely to seek or be able to obtain protection from
state courts against their own families and communities, and witnesses are
unlikely to cooperate with the prosecution in criminal cases. The
exceptional few complainants who resort to state protection will be chastised
by their families and communities, and may struggle for survival because
they are often dependent on their families and communities. The idea of
human rights protection itself will probably be discredited as a neocolonial
imposition. In the final analysis, I would rather see gradual change in
religious norms and social practices that preempt human rights violations
than a rhetorical appearance of protection by state courts that is neither
accessible to potential victims nor effective or sustainable in the community
at large. I believe this position to be more consistent with a commitment to
equal human rights than with legal protection that is perceived by the
victims themselves to be competing with their fidelity to their families and
communities.63
To summarize, this Article and my previous works cited herein have
advocated for Sharica and state law to be complementary normative systems,
instead of being in mutually destructive conflict, each system must operate
on its own terms and within its field of competency and authority. As I see
it, the proposed compatibility dialectic works as follows. First, the
constructive and legitimate relationship of Sharica and state law can be
promoted by upholding the true nature and purpose of each system. Sharica
remains binding on Muslims from a religious point of view, which can only
be fulfilled through voluntary personal compliance that is undermined by
futile attempts of coercive enforcement as state law. That religious
obligation is fully consistent with—and is indeed facilitated by—the
religious neutrality of the state and the integrity of its necessarily secular
law. The role of state law in facilitating this dialectic relationship is not only
to protect freedom of religion and other human rights for all citizens,

62. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REALIZING THE PROMISE
OURSELVES (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim ed., 2003) (discussing the complex limitations on
what state courts can do to protect human rights, especially of vulnerable groups like women and
children).
63. An-Nacim, Religious Norms, supra note 9, at 799–800.
FOR
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Muslims and non-Muslims equally and without discrimination, but also to
safeguard the integrity and religious neutrality of the state and state law.64
Secondly, the role of Sharica in facilitating the dialectic is to support and
sustain over time this dual role of state law. For instance, the successful
mediation of this dialectic needs to be sustained by and intended to facilitate
internal debate and critical reflection within and among Islamic and other
religious communities to promote the legitimacy and efficacy of the process
of dialectic mediation as a whole. In particular, internal debate and critical
reflection should also promote a shared understanding of freedom of
religion, that is consistent with the constitutional and human rights
obligations of the state, for all citizens, without distinction or discrimination.
This internally legitimate understanding of freedom of religion is necessary
for Muslims and other believers to combine a genuine feeling of religious
compliance with unqualified commitment to abide by state law.65
Lastly, it should remain possible for some norms of Sharica to be
enacted into state law provided this is done through civic reason within the
framework of constitutionalism, human rights and equal citizenship for all,
Muslims and non-Muslims, men and women. While this is imperative for
the principle of the legality of state law to be enforced by state courts and
other official institutions, it should remain possible for citizens to engage in
private consensual mediation of their disputes for exclusively voluntary
compliance outside state institutions. Still, the state has the obligation to
ensure the voluntariness and fairness of such private arrangements as an
integral part of its general obligation to keep the peace and protect the
human rights of all citizens.66

64.
65.
66.

An-Naicim, The Compatibility Dialectic, supra note 48, at 28–29.
Id.
Id. at 29.
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